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Abstract—This paper introduces a method for unsupervised
tokenization of Controller Area Network (CAN) data payloads
using bit level transition analysis and a greedy grouping strategy.
The primary goal of this proposal is to extract individual time
series which have been concatenated together before transmission
onto a vehicle’s CAN bus. This process is necessary because
the documentation for how to properly extract data from a
network may not always be available; passenger vehicle CAN
configurations are protected as trade secrets. At least one major
manufacturer has also been found to deliberately misconfigure
their documented extraction methods. Thus, this proposal serves
as a critical enabler for robust third-party security auditing and
intrusion detection systems which do not rely on manufacturers
sharing confidential information.
Index Terms—Controller Area Network, CAN, embedded sys-
tems, Cyber Physical, Lexical Analysis, Reverse Engineering,
Passenger Vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
Current production vehicles are becoming as much software
as they are hardware. Their networks now feature optional
persistent Internet connections and are complex enough to
support emerging technologies such as autonomous driving
and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) applications [1]. Mass pro-
duction of vehicles with Internet accessible computers capable
of controlling all aspects of the vehicle makes incorporating
and validating defense in depth cyber security techniques a
practical necessity.
Bug bounty programs, Cyber Emergency Response Teams
(CERT), and widely attended ’hacker’ conferences are all
strong evidence that independent research is an essential part
of developing and validating robust cyber security practices.
We assume that the computing systems and networks used
in the automotive industry are no exception to needing third
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party security auditing to establish and improve robust defense
in depth security measures. Third party research also ensures
that accidental or deliberate network flaws such as the 2015
Volkswagen emission scandal are identified and corrected
more quickly [2]. To that end, we intend the methods presented
in this paper to address the absence of a CAN payload tok-
enization technique. Without an effective payload tokenization
technique, third party research is limited to manual reverse
engineering a small set of vehicles and hoping those are rep-
resentative of the broader market, using methods which ignore
the useful information present in CAN payloads, or somehow
gain access to confidential manufacturer specifications.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Automated Network Traffic Reverse Engineering
The concept of automated protocol reverse engineering
using observed network traffic is an active area of research.
However, practically all published research is focused on
analyzing a heterogeneous mix of text-based application layer
protocols with the goal of facilitating deep packet inspection
[3]–[7]. The approach presented in this paper is based on
analyzing payloads of a single known protocol-Controller Area
Network (CAN)-which is not text-based. The key difference
is the difficulty of lexical analysis.
We propose the difference between translating sentences
written using Japanese Katakana and English is a reasonable
analogy to the difference between existing research and the
problem addressed by this paper. Automated translation of
either language certainly shares similarities once the words in
a sentence and their ordering have been identified. However,
with text-based network protocols and English there is a
finite set of delimiters that are almost always present between
‘words’. Thus, the lexical analysis phase proposed in [3]–[7]
and related work is almost always a trivial process using a
set of delimiter characters known a priori. Sentences written
with Japanese Katakana and CAN payloads do not use explicit
delimiters. This makes ‘word’ discovery non-trivial in these
contexts.
The approach proposed by Markovitz and Wool is the only
published method found to address the problem of automated
reverse engineering of CAN protocol payloads [10]. Markovitz
and Wool proposed a brute force search followed by heuristic
selection using the number of unique values present in each
time series considered. The authors reported that this lexical
analysis method had poor accuracy using self generated net-
work data. Thus, the reverse engineering pipeline presented
in this paper is assumed to be the first proposal for robust
automated reverse engineering of non-text network protocol
payloads.
B. Tokenization
The term tokenization is taken from compiler design in
computer science. Compilers are the software which converts
a program into a series of operations that can run on computer
hardware [8]. Lexical analysis is the first step of a compiler
which uses human readable programming code as an input.
The tokenization process identifies the individual logical units,
or tokens, that code consists of. For example, the following
program code results in the nine tokens ‘for’, ‘x’, ‘in’, ‘range’,
‘(’, ‘0’, ‘,’, ‘10’, ‘)’:
for x in range(0, 10)
If the f and o in the token ‘for’ are incorrectly separated
during tokenization, then the following steps in the compiler
will fail. The compilation should also fail if the tokens ‘for’
and ‘x’ are not separated during tokenization.
We define the tokenization of CAN data as the process of
identifying the logically distinct time series present within
message payloads using the same arbitration ID. The term
time series is taken from the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) definition of a univariate sequence of val-
ues ordered by the time observed [9]. Examples of time series
in a vehicle might be measurements by an Electronic Control
Unit (ECU) monitoring the front right wheel’s rotations per
minute (RPM), steering wheel angle, or engine RPM. We will
refer to individual time series extracted through tokenization
simply as signals for the remainder of this paper.
As an example, imagine the RPM signal for two of a
vehicle’s wheels and a checksum are all contained in the set
of 64-bit payloads using a CAN arbitration ID of 0xA15. The
two RPM measurements and checksum are 8-bit signals. A
possible tokenization would be the set of start and stop indices:
(0, 7), (8, 15), (56, 63). The bit positions 16 through 55 are
padding bits which are consistently 1 or 0 in every observed
payload using ID 0xA15. Figure 1 depicts this hypothetical
tokenization scenario.
We empirically found that tokenization is necessary to
correctly interpret CAN message payloads. This is because a
series of payloads using a shared arbitration ID often contains
multiple sensor readings concatenated together. This obser-
vation is echoed by other third party CAN research findings
[10], [11]. Thus, we define the input of CAN tokenization as
Fig. 1. Example of a CAN payload tokenization
a series of chronologically-ordered CAN message payloads
present in a sample of CAN network traffic which share the
same arbitration ID. We assume payloads for each ID always
use the same bit-width (e.g., the payload is always 64-bits) and
logical formatting. This assumption is based on our empirical
analysis of eight vehicles produced for the United Sates market
and the findings of Miller and Valasek [11]. The output of
CAN tokenization is the set of bit positions within the payload
that bound each logically-distinct signal.
Correct payload tokenization and classification of CAN sig-
nals enables a broad range of findings. For example, extracting
the brake pedal position signal from a CAN bus is sufficient
to identify who is driving the vehicle out of a population
of known drivers [12]. Using the signal type, transmission
frequency, and other features may be sufficient to fingerprint
specific Electronic Control Unit (ECU) hardware in a similar
fashion. Automating the process of fingerprinting particular
ECUs could lead to rapidly, passively, and cheaply identifying
vehicles affected by published ECU firmware vulnerabilities.
Again, the first step to achieving such results is the tokeniza-
tion of CAN payloads.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
A. Transition Analysis
The goal of this initial CAN payload tokenization proposal
is to correctly extract continuous numerical signals transmitted
over a vehicle’s CAN bus. We assume the preponderance of
payloads produced in production CAN networks are mostly
comprised of continuous and categorical data. This assumption
is again based on empirical research of eight production vehi-
cles and the work done by Miller and Valasek [11]. Extracting
continuous numerical signals from a heterogeneous population
of continuous and categorical signals achieves three important
objectives. First, it provides the continuous numerical signals
as a ready-to-analyze output. Second, removing these signals
reduces the bit width of the remaining payload segments
which need to be tokenized. Third, removing continuous data
from observed CAN payloads allows methods targeted for the
tokenization of categorical data to operate with the assumption
that the data set is a homogeneous population of categorical
data.
The reason continuous numerical signals can and should
be targeted first is because there’s a predictable relationship
between bit positions used to convey continuous numerical
data. Numerical data can be represented with a binary protocol
like CAN using a range of encoding schemes such as unsigned
values or signed values using two’s compliment, one’s com-
pliment, signed magnitude, and more. The common feature
of these various encoding schemes is the notion that bits are
TABLE I
EXAMPLE BOOLEAN MATRIX OF PAYLOADS FOR A SINGLE ARB ID
Observation
Bit Position
2
7
2
6
2
5
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
ordered from a least significant bit (LSB) to a most significant
bit (MSB). The LSB represents the 20’s place and the MSB
represents the 2n−1’s place where n is the bit width being
used.
We empirically found that vehicle sensors sampling contin-
uous real world processes such as velocity, pedal position,
and steering angle many times a second using numerical
data will produce approximately continuous numerical time
series. To say this another way, vehicle sensors measuring
locomotion will report numbers that have small differences
between sequential samples. RPM will not jump between
1,200, 7,000, back down to 2,000, and then 5,000 within
one second unless the engine might be exploding. Rather, a
generally smooth increase from one value to another will be
observed such as 2,000 to 2,032 and then 2,053 RPM.
The use of bit ordering from LSB to MSB and the ap-
proximately continuous numerical nature of signals produced
by locomotion related ECUs causes predictable relationships
to form between neighboring bit positions within CAN pay-
loads. Transition analysis can quantify this predictability for
unsupervised payload tokenization.
A bit position transitions when it flips between 1 and 0
in chronologically-sequenced CAN payloads using the same
arbitration ID and bit width. Bit level transition analysis can
be efficiently calculated by storing observed payloads into an
M ×N boolean matrix. M is the number of row vectors with
one row per observed CAN message payload. N is the bit
width of the payloads with column vectors representing the
relative bit positions within the payloads. See Table I for an
example of a 10 x 8 boolean matrix representing 10 samples
of an 8-bit payload.
By performing an exclusive or (XOR) of each sequential
pair of row vectors in such a boolean matrix, a transition
matrix is the created with M − 1 rows and 1s anywhere a bit
transition occurred. Table II is the transition matrix produced
from Table I. In this example the 0th row vector is XORed
with the 1st row vector.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
TABLE II
EXAMPLE TRANSITIONMATRIX AND TRANSITIONAGGREGATION
XOR Result
Bit Position
2
7
2
6
2
5
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
0
Obs. 0⊕ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Obs. 1⊕ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Obs. 2⊕ 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Obs. 3⊕ 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Obs. 4⊕ 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Obs. 5⊕ 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Obs. 6⊕ 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Obs. 7⊕ 8 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Obs. 8⊕ 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
TANG 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 9
The 1st row vector is XORed with the 2nd row vector and
so on for all sequential row vectors in the boolean matrix.
Summing the 1s in each column vector (bit position) of
the transition matrix produces a 1 × N row vector. For the
remainder of this proposal this summary row vector will be
referred to as a Transition Aggregation N-Gram (TANG).
B. Greedy Bit-Position Grouping
Bit positions with the largest transition count in a TANG
might be the LSB of a numerical signal within the CAN
payloads. If a LSB and its neighboring bit positions represent
a monotonically-decreasing gradient of transition counts in
a TANG, this is evidence that they belong to the same
continuous numerical signal. This behavior is demonstrated in
the TANG produced from Table I. Bit position 20 was the LSB
of the bit positions representing the unsigned integer sequence
counting from 0 in row 0 to 9 in row 9.
Algorithm 1 presents a greedy strategy for clustering bit
positions suspected of being a continuous numerical signal
using TANGs. The benefits of this greedy approach are the
ability to work with the univariate format of TANGs, no
requirement to specify the number of signals in a payload,
and no reliance on heuristics or a priori knowledge of the
CAN payload. It is possible to implement Algorithm 1 without
sorting a copy of the TANG or using nested loops; however,
this slightly more inefficient version is presented to allow for
a conceptually straightforward written explanation.
Algorithm 1 begins by sorting a TANG by observed transi-
tion count on line 6. This sorted list of bit positions is placed
in a stack (a last in-first out data structure) with bit positions
that transitioned the most frequently at the top of the stack.
The stack is iteratively popped on lines 9 and 10 until all bit
positions have been considered. When a bit position is popped
from the top of the stack, the conditional statement on line 11
uses the ‘complete’ list to check if it is already clustered. If
not, the assumption is made that this bit position is the least
significant bit (LSB) of a signal. Lines 12 through 15 create
a new cluster with this bit position.
The nested loop on lines 16 through 21 then consider
all bit positions on the left-hand or right-hand side (endian
dependent) of the new LSB. These neighbor bit positions
are added to the new cluster of bit positions while they
Algorithm 1 Greedy Payload Tokenization Using Its TANG
Require: A 2xN matrix with one row of bit position indices
and a corresponding row for the TANG. The columns
represent the 0th to n-1 bit positions of a particular
arbitration ID’s CAN payloads.
1: if data payload is assumed to use big-endian then
2: offset ← −1
3: else
4: offset ← 1
5: end if
6: stack ← sort by transition count(TANG)
7: clusters ← [ ]
8: complete ← [ ]
9: while stack not empty do
10: current ← stack.pop
11: if current.index not in complete then
12: cluster ← [ ]
13: cluster.append(current)
14: complete.append(current.index)
15: neighbor ← TANG[current.index + offset]
16: while neighbor.transitions ≤ current.transitions do
17: cluster.append(neighbor)
18: complete.append(neighbor.index)
19: current ← neighbor
20: neighbor ← TANG[neighbor.index + offset]
21: end while
22: clusters.append(cluster)
23: end if
24: end while
25: return clusters
represent a monotonically-decreasing gradient of transition
values in the TANG. The ‘less than or equal’ transition count
comparison on line 16 could be replaced with an adjustable
maximum difference threshold. Once all bit positions have
been considered, the clusters are returned as output. Each
cluster of bit positions represent an educated guess about
where continuous numerical signals exist in the arbitration
ID’s payloads. The maximum difference threshold method was
used when producing findings and examples for this paper.
IV. FINDINGS
A. Anecdotal Results of Greedy CAN Payload Tokenization
In this section several anecdotal examples of TANGs and the
results of Algorithm 1 are presented based upon approximately
10 minutes of CAN network traffic collected from a 2012
model year minivan being operated in city driving conditions.
This vehicle is one of eight model year 2008 or later passenger
vehicles studied. This sample population of vehicles includes
sedans, sport utility vehicles, pickup trucks, and minivans.
These vehicles used traditional gasoline internal combustion
or hybrid powertrains; no diesel vehicles were studied. Two
vehicles were equipped with a manual transmission. While the
CAN network in each vehicle studied is at least superficially
unique, we found Algorithm 1 achieved similar success across
Fig. 2. An Example of an Easily Tokenized Payload
Fig. 3. A Payload With Two Time Series Concatenated Together
all of the vehicles. Due to space limitations, only anecdotal
results from one vehicle will be presented.
These findings are deliberately presented as anecdotal re-
sults as opposed to a qualitative evaluation using synthesized
data. Providing specific qualitative performance statistics for
Algorithm 1 using synthetic (but known) CAN traffic is
unhelpful at best and misleading at worst. The fundamental
problem being addressed by this paper is a lack of a priori
knowledge of the CAN network beyond the CAN protocol
specification. Creating a testbed CAN network and explicitly
or implicitly claiming it is representative of all production ve-
hicle CAN networks for the purposes of validating Algorithm
1 is a non-trivial claim. Unfortunately, further exploring the
interesting problem of creating a sufficiently ‘representative’
CAN network is also beyond the scope and length limits of
this paper.
Figures 2 and 3 are examples of CAN payloads with
continuous numerical signals targeted by Algorithm 1. With
the exception of the bottom plot in each figure, these plots
represent each logically distinct time series present in the
payloads of the listed arbitration IDs. These time series plots
represent a non-overlapping subset of bit positions present in
the total payload size shown in the TANG plot at the bottom
of each figure. The vertical axis of these time series plots is
the unsigned integer interpretation for the indicated cluster of
bit positions within each payload. The horizontal axis is the
chronological index of the payloads observed in the sample.
Fig. 4. An Example of Tokenization Consistency and Time Series Similarities
Thus, these time series plots can be read from left to right as
the unsigned integer value that cluster of bit positions took on
as time progressed in the driving sample.
The TANG plot at the bottom of each figure is a graphical
representation of the TANG for the listed arbitration ID. The
vertical axis of this TANG plot is the min-max normalized
transition count (transitions divided by total observations) for
each bit position in the eight byte payloads. Higher values
on this vertical axis indicate the bit position marked by the
horizontal axis transitioned more frequently. The horizontal
axis indicates the total bit positions in the series of observed
payloads.
Vertical dashed lines indicate the most significant bit (MSB)
of a signal identified by Algorithm 1. The LSB of each signal
is not explicitly identified to avoid clutter. However, both the
LSB and MSB are explicitly listed in the sub-title of each time
series plot. Grey points in the TANG plot indicate possible
padding bits observed in the CAN data sample; these bit
positions never transitioned in the driving sample.
Figure 4 is an example of how time series similar to those
seen Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are consistently tokenized by Algorithm
1 across multiple arbitration IDs in a production vehicle. We
found the phenomenon of similar time series being present to
occur in all eight vehicles studied.
V. FUTURE WORK
In the future we will present an unsupervised pipeline for
identifying and clustering continuous numerical signals ex-
pected to be correctly tokenized by the proposed tokenization
strategy. This pipeline was used to generate the signal cluster
in Fig. 4. The pipeline will be used to rapidly produce a
large data set of accurately tokenized time series present in
production CAN networks. That empirical data set will be
used to formulate a ‘gold standard’ labeled data set as part
of a proposal for robust validation of tokenization or intrusion
detection algorithms for cyber-physical systems using CAN.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced the idea of CAN payload tokenization
and motivated the need for such a pipeline. Section III pro-
posed an efficient method of quantifying predictable bit level
relationships in CAN payloads using Transition Aggregation
N-Grams (TANGs). A greedy strategy was proposed as a proof
of concept for how TANGs can be used to automate CAN
payload tokenization. Section IV presents three examples of
Algorithm 1’s performance with real world CAN data.
Payload tokenization techniques are sorely needed for third-
party research in domains using CAN and similar protocols.
This proposal partially addresses that shortfall.
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